The Hybrid Hominin: A Renewed Point of Departure For Philosophical Anthropology. by Moss, Lenny
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE HYBRID HOMININ: A RENEWED POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
Lenny Moss

 				           {{ABSTRACT}}











 	The goal of this paper will be nothing short of offering a new point of departure for philosophical anthropology (and thereby for philosophy and the human sciences in general). The crux of this effort will be developed around a novel concept of the ‘Hybrid Hominin’ and an exploration of its descriptive and normative implications. The intentions will not be to jettison prior insights from philosophical anthropology but rather to recontextualize them in a way that both preserves and yet further mobilizes their insights. Indeed the very measure of the success of this enterprise will be precisely its ability to bring the legacy of philosophical anthropology to further fruition and in the context of dialogues with some of the contributors to this valuable new collection. 

 			                Detachment and Normativity
 	In previous work I have endeavored to extend the idea of human ‘detachment’ in the direction of a general philosophy of nature in the context of which the ‘place of humans’ could be better and more naturalistically situated.​[1]​ The present paper will begin by moving to further specify what this means within the spectrum of phenomena we recognize as that of ‘life’. The central claim is that ‘life moves in the direction of increasingly being able to constitute its own norms’. A great deal of emphasis will be placed upon the idea that it was ‘the Group’ and not the individual Hominin that was the ‘unit’ of normative transition in anthropogenesis and, in dialogue with some of the papers in this collection, we will make the case for how this insight offers a radically new point of departure for philosophical anthropology. Along the way, we will also, but only at this time in preliminary and suggestive ways, gesture toward Hegel as a fellow-traveler in the enterprise of philosophical anthropology. 
 	Some notion of ‘natural detachment’ has constituted a continuous thread throughout the history of ‘philosophical anthropology’ extending all the way from Herder’s seminal late 18th century work, through Nietzsche, Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, and Blumenberg (and beyond). By ‘natural detachment’ what has generally been intended is the idea that humans (and their ancestors), as a natural species, are born uniquely bereft of the kinds of adaptive physiological attunements that enable other species to enjoy a stable form of natural existence (so long as they do). For Herder this was a double-edged sword. It meant that humans also were granted a kind of dispensation from the unavoidable demands that come with ‘instinctual’ attunement. Orphans of nature on the one hand, but also those released from the beck and call of any particular frequency of nature, on the other. Humans were those endowed with the capacity for deliberately turning their attention ‘inward’, that is, of ‘Besonnenheit’, and thus capable of self-constitution. The very idea of being the species that can enjoy ‘openness to the world’ presupposes just such a rupture and its concomitant challenge. A move in the direction of some notion of freedom, as is implied by reference to a transition toward ‘world openness’, has often sat in an ambiguous relationship with what has generally been a stronger emphasis upon natural deficiency. Indeed, for Gehlen, as well as for Blumenberg (see the preceding discussions by Schacht and Pavesich), the question of how ‘Man’ is even possible, that is, existentially viable, is the paramount question. We will suggest that an overemphasis on human deficiency has been due to a misconception of anthropogenesis. 
 	While our contemporary cosmology as a whole would seem to be very much in flux and thus not readily lending itself to overarching generalizations​[2]​, at least a part of our universe, we’ve suggested, can be said to be ‘exploring greater levels of detachment’. Detachment here is meant to connote an increase in relative independence vis-à-vis its surround. A sub-atomic particle, such as a photon, that lacks a rest-mass, can be said to be less ‘detached’ than a particle with a rest mass, which thereby constitutes a well in space-time. The formation of ‘matter’ in this sense is already an act of ‘detachment’. At least at very elementary levels, matter of different sizes and complexity can be described in terms of ‘degrees of freedom’. To know the degrees of freedom of an entity is to be able to specify its space of possibilities. The greater the number of the degrees of freedom the richer the possibility space and thereby the more ‘detached’ is the entity. A simple hydrogen atom with one proton and one electron can respond to a perturbation in terms of five degrees of freedom. It can ‘translate’, that is, move in space, along three different axes; it can rotate; or it can elevate the energy level of its electron. A simple bi-atomic molecule, such O​​2 is also able to vibrate along the axis of its covalent bond and thus enjoys six degrees of freedom. So far as we understand, how an atom or simple molecule responds to a perturbation is purely stochastic. We appeal here to no more than common intuition to suggest that the ability to respond to a perturbation in two ways constitutes greater ‘independence’ than that which could only respond in one way, and ditto for six versus five. One will also notice that the covalent bond that ups the ante by one degree of freedom also constrains the two oxygen atoms from responding independently. However relatively simple this example may be, the idea that increases in autonomy always also entail constraints can be taken as a basic insight into ‘natural detachment’ that is scale invariant. 
 	Simple increases in the size of material entities can be seen to entail also qualitative changes, or transitions, in properties that correspond intuitively with degrees of relative independence and thus levels of detachment. The molecule known as ‘butane’ is a four carbon, saturated hydrocarbon. It consists of four carbons in a linear chain with all the remaining carbon valences bonded to hydrogen atoms. It thereby consists of four carbons and ten hydrogen atoms. If butane were subject to a perturbation, in addition to the kinds of responses already discussed, it could also undergo an ‘isomerization’ (or ‘mutation’) reaction resulting in a transition to a branched structure known as ‘isobutane’. Whereby simpler-system responses would be seen as lacking any history, that is, subsequent perturbation-responses would be indifferent to prior perturbation-responses, the transition from butane to isobutane (or vice versa) would mark a new threshold whereby subsequent perturbation-responses would no longer be indifferent to prior perturbation-responses. The ability to speak of a material entity having a ‘history’ or following an ‘historical trajectory’ suggests a higher level of relative distinctiveness, independence, and detachment than that which is nothing but a happenstance sequence of unrelated random events. 
 	While we could speak of molecules at the level of complexity, or greater, than butane having a history, we would not be tempted to suggest that said history was driven by any internal preferences for one configuration or another. But what if an affiliation of butane molecules appeared which interacted in such a fashion as to either inhibit or promote transitions from butane to isobutane? On first pass we might be tempted to wonder whether we are looking at the behavior of some living activity. But what provokes that intuition? A system which acts in such a way as to determine its own outcome appears to have seized the reins in a qualitatively new way. Implicit in the perception of a natural phenomenon actively biasing its own future state is the presence of a norm, that is, a criterion for what counts as a better or worse outcome. An entity (be it composite or otherwise) that can act such as to be in accord with an implicit, internal norm, is surely more relatively independent and detached than any entity that cannot. As previously argued, even an enzyme, a single macromolecule, can be said to enact a norm in returning to its original confirmation after undergoing a catalysis-inducing perturbation at its active site. 
 	At least in a rough and ready way, life – which has never been adequately nor consensually defined – can be identified as that threshold of natural detachment in which nature increasingly moves in the direction of being able to constitute its own norms. Above the threshold of detachment marked by the onset of life, the exploration of higher levels of detachment, just is about further normative self-determination. To be more detached, more autonomous, is to have a greater wherewithal to define the norms of an existence, of a way and a form of life. 

 		           Mangelwesen and/or Normative Self-Realization? 
 	The story we are telling at this point would seem to run afoul of the basic insights of Philosophical Anthropology. If Nature moves progressively toward forms of norm-constituting self-realization, then where and how can it have given rise to creatures, that the likes of Gehlen and Blumenberg tell us, are problems to themselves? Gehlen tells us in no uncertain terms that for the human the very possibility of existence is a dire problem, in fact is the problem. Must we postulate some form of radical break with the continuity of nature, as much of the rhetoric of philosophical anthropology has often done, in order to account for the ostensible deficiencies of the human as a ‘natural’ being? Or is there another way of reconciling this apparent paradox? 
 	The missing link, it will be argued, that allows us to overcome this putative contradiction pertains to the status of what we will call the ‘Hominin Group’. By ‘Hominin’ I adopt the recent usage within evolutionary anthropology of the term used to refer to all those bipedal primates beginning with Australopithecine and culminating, at least up to the present, in modern Homo sapien sapiens. The appearance of the Hominin line did indeed represent a new stage in life constituting its own norms but only if understood at the level of the Group not the individual. It was the Hominin Group not the hominin individual that constituted the new unit of detachment. I have in previous work, and for the sake of simplicity, referred to this simply as ‘The First Detachment’. While I think the evidence for the primacy of the Hominin Group has become more than abundant, its significance for philosophical anthropology has thus far been largely ignored. 

 		                  First Detachment: The Primordial Group
 	A logic of progressive normative self-realization (and one would not be misguided to hear echoes of Hegel) as the further continuation of detachment, would anticipate transitions from more implicit to more explicit, from weaker to stronger, and, at least eventually from something like a ‘normativity-in-itself’ to a ‘normativity-for-itself’. On such purely theoretical, even speculative, grounds, it would make sense to posit the emergence of a Group capable of new levels of fluidity and flexibility in constituting norms that are even further detached from the dictates of any particular ‘natural frequencies’. That said, both empirical psychology and phenomenology have provided evidence, extending from late 19th century and now into the 21st, of the deep roots of group behavior and orientation, in the ‘archeology’ of the human brain/mind. This evidence has seldom, if ever, been used to ‘excavate’ the ‘primordial group’ but that is exactly the present intention. 
 	Curiously, almost dramatically, the most fundamental premise of philosophical anthropology, the idea that humans have become bereft of instinct, is fundamentally, if inadvertently, contradicted by the emergent talk of late 19th century inquiries into the nature of group psychology. Consider the following introductory remarks by Gustave Le Bon from his influential The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. 

	Crowds, doubtless are always unconscious, but this very unconsciousness is perhaps
 	one of the secrets of their strength. In the natural world beings exclusively governed
 	by instinct accomplish acts whose marvelous complexity astounds us. Reason is an 
 	attribute of humanity of too recent date and still too imperfect to reveal to us the laws
 	of the unconscious, and still more to take its place. The part played by the 
 	unconscious in all our acts is immense, and that played by reason very small. The
 	unconscious acts like a force still unknown. ​[3]​

Le Bon finds in the behavior of crowds a universal human propensity to assume a different, distinctive, less individuated state of consciousness, that appears to hark back to an early ancestral state of existence, with instinctual response patterns that had adaptive value. When philosophical anthropologists spoke of ‘instinct’ what they had in mind was response patterns to ‘natural’ not social stimuli. Might it be that Le Bon has in some sense anticipated insights into the deep sociality and sociability of humans that only 21st century (see below) psychology has begun to empirically elucidate? 
 	In his seminal work on Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, which began with a discussion of Le Bon, Freud eventually asserts that:

 	Thus the group appears to us as a revival of the primal horde. Just as primitive man 
 	survives potentially in every individual, so the primal horde may arise once more out 
 	of any random collection; in so far as men are habitually under the sway of group
 	formation we recognize in it the survival of the primal horde. We must conclude that 
 	psychology of groups is the oldest human psychology; what we have isolated as 
 	individual psychology, by neglecting all traces of the group, has only since come into 
 	prominence out of the old group psychology, by a gradual process which may still,
 	perhaps, be described as incomplete. (Freud, 1959, p.55, emphasis added)

 	Where our experience (and I do mean our experience) of crowd behavior may provide a most conspicuous window onto our groupish ancestry, evidence for the primordiality of the Hominin Group can also be found in what is most common and mundane in human behavior. While it was certainly not the case that Heidegger, in his characterization of ‘Das Man’ or ‘the They’, intended to recover the lineaments of an ancestral hominin in his existential phenomenology, would this not be exactly the best explanation for what he very aptly exposed as the nature of the 'everyday' man and woman? Proximally and for the most part, as Heidegger would say, in the course of our everyday rounds, we lose ourselves in the behavior and implicit norms of the mass, of the generalized others amongst whom we dwell. Out of the corners of our eyes, as it were, we tacitly measure the distance between ourselves and others, in how we walk, how we stand and sit, how we adorn ourselves, how near and far, how loud and soft, we are in engaging others, in relation to which we adjust, we cleave to an average, we fall in line with implicit behavioral norms as they are being enacted. What would it mean for humans or pre-human Hominins to be constituents of a highly-normatively integrated Group? Heidegger’s characterisation of how, in the absence of forces to the contrary, we fall into ‘the They’, we should notice, need not presuppose the acquisition and use of language. Could it be that Heidegger has inadvertently found a window onto the life of, for example, Homo erectus who sustained a highly social, encampment-based, existence for over a million years prior to the advent of spoken language? 
 	For something like a ‘Hominin Group’ to constitute a radical new transition in levels of detachment, as characterized by a qualitative change in the degree to which ‘nature’ has become capable of constituting its own norms, the Hominin Group must have represented a leap forward in the capacity for flexible and adaptive responses to environmental contingencies along with mechanisms for rapid internal dissemination, integration and stabilization of de facto adaptive norms. Le Bon and Freud conceived of a kind of ‘unconscious mental life’ characterized by 1) a sense of ‘invincible power’ through group identification, 2) a susceptibility to emotional contagion, and 3) susceptibility to suggestion.​[4]​ For Freud, hypnosis provided a clear window onto our Group ancestry because the fact of hypnosis just is an isolated instance of Group behavior.​[5]​ Curiously, it is not until recent and current work conducted by cognitive psychologist Michael Tomasello that motivations and unique cognitive capacities specifically for cooperation have become the focal point and yet these now mark what are arguably the most empirically robust studies in favor of the Hominin Group model.
 	Michael Tomasello​[6]​ tells us, somewhat controversially, that if an ape, even a human-acculturated ape, is looking for food, and a human points toward food that can be found, the ape will not understand. The ape, as it were, doesn’t ask herself why is someone pointing. When an ape points, it is always, or almost always, an imperative, that is, meaning ‘Go and get that for me’. The concept of pointing for the sake of providing information in response to a recognized need is foreign to apes but apparently universal in even pre-linguistic infants. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, infants but not apes will cooperate in pulling a platform that brings forth a single allotment of food that therefore would need to be shared. Apes, by contrast, will cooperate to bring forth food, but only if the portions are separated into allotments that are only accessible to each so that no requirement for sharing is needed. The prospect of sharing a bounty for apes defeats the interest whereas for infants it is no deterrent at all. What Tomasello wants us to understand is that infants, but not apes, who may well be able to solve practical problems individually as well or better than the infants, have a cognitive capacity for ‘we-intentionality’ that apes lack. We know that you are looking for food and we understand that I am trying to help you find it. We know that we want that food and we know that we can share it. Tomasello has gone to some pains to show that helping behavior in human infants is spontaneous and not predicated upon parental rewards and that infants will even forego an individually enjoyable activity to engage in helping behavior. There are two general observations about human sociality that can be made on the basis of these studies and it is the second upon which I want to elaborate. The first is that human infants, even prior to language, possess a cognitive infrastructure, a cognitive capacity for ‘we-intentionality’ that so far as we know, no other species possesses. This breakthrough understanding by Tomasello surely must be one of the most significant achievements of contemporary experimental psychology. The second, I think less explored and developed observation, is that infants are deploying these capacities in cooperative acts as ends-in-themselves, and I would refer to this as pertaining to the affective infrastructure of human sociality and sociability. How and why are cooperative acts in-themselves attractors for human infants? And have we uncovered another window onto the origins of humanity in the primordial Hominin Group? 
 	Although a thorough discussion of the affective infrastructure of the Hominin Group can’t be addressed here at this time, there are important new insights, wholly consistent with the Hominin Group hypothesis, provided in recent work by the evolutionary behavioral ecologist Sarah Hrdy. The capacity to cooperate is based upon what we would call both cognitive and emotional factors although it’s not clear that these are ultimately distinguishable.
 	Whereas one might imagine that hominin cooperativity is an outgrowth of the dyadic mother-infant relationship, exactly the opposite appears to be the case: it is the loss of the exclusive relationship between mother and infant and the distribution of affective ties amongst the members of the larger group, beginning right after birth, that is distinctive of the Hominin line. Hominins and ultimately humans in particular could only have evolved as cooperative breeders. Prior to the detachment of the Hominin Group, as a rule the larger the baby the longer the delay between the next birth. Humans are the exceptions with the largest, slowest maturing, and most costly babies but also the species that breeds most frequently amongst primates.​[7]​ Chimpanze, orangutan, and gorilla mothers are more single-mindedly devoted to their progeny than human mothers are and for a much longer time, and whereby other ape mothers protect and covet their neonates unconditionally, human mothers will inspect and reject them if they are deficient or if the circumstances are not right for raising them.​[8]​
 	The evidence of evolutionary behaviorial ecology is wholly consistent with the idea of a radical transition in hominin evolution in which the Group emerges as the functional unit, or in other words, the unit of detachment. Hrdy concurs that already a million and a half years ago African ancestors of Homo sapiens (that is, Homo erectus) were already emotionally very different from the ancestors of any extant ape.​[9]​

 		               Second Detachment: The Hybrid Hominin
 	We began this essay with the promise of providing a new point of departure for philosophical anthropology based upon a new or revised ‘Wissenschaftlich’ philosophy of nature. It’s time now to start making good on that promise. 
 	The hominin Homo erectus flourished for well over a million years. The expansion of brain size from that of Australopithecines to that of Homo erectus (80% of the modern human brain size) marked the largest single expansion of brain capacity in anthropogenesis.​[10]​ The progeny of Homo erectus would have also been born with pre-mature brains subject to ‘an extra-uterine year’ of rapid growth and structuration, and, as Sarah Hrdy tells us, would have been ‘emotionally modern’ in the sense of having developed foundational affective ties with multiple members of their community. Homo erectus lived a social existence in permanent encampments warmed by the domesticated use of fire. They had the wherewithal to engage in organized giant-mammal hunts that required a differentiation of roles and they produced hand axes of sufficient sophistication as to require practices of apprenticeship and pedagogy for transmission across generations. Long before Homo sapien animal trackers left Africa and established root-stock populations throughout the world, Homo erectus left Africa and colonized all the contiguous land masses of the Eurasian continents. 
 	Homo erectus did not have the benefit of spoken language but without question constituted a pervasively, normatively-structured world. Homo erectus, in all likelihood, exemplified the idea of the Hominin Group that’s been proposed. The idea then would be that Homo erectus represented a radically new expression of nature constituting its own norms, but at the level of a tightly normatively integrated group and that Homo erectus coped with the insecurity of its detachment from nature largely as a group and not at the level of individuals. What this means then, is that the proper point of departure for philosophical anthropology is NOT that of the emergence of a physiologically challenged being ‘in nature’ but rather that of the partial and perhaps progressive detachment of hominin individuals from the primordial Group resulting in what I’ve referred to as the ‘Hybrid Hominin’. 
 	Much of the ‘natural deficiency’ thematized by philosophical anthropologists would have already been well in place in Homo erectus but to say that Homo erectus was a problem to herself would seem to be a bit rash if not ostensibly absurd. The loss of physiological pre-specialization combined with the gain of the affective and cognitive capacities for cooperative ‘we-mode’ were the very conditions of possibility for nature to explore new dimensions of normative autonomy. The supposition here is that the further enhancement of the capacities of individuals to optimally participate and respond to the normative dynamics of the group led to something new under the sun. Nature discovered a new opening for further detachment, for a new transition toward even greater normative self-constitution, when, to borrow some language from Hegel, normativity-in-itself began to become normativity-for-itself. Normativity enters a new level of autonomy when individuals begin to constitute themselves as normative subjects who can take stands as individuals based upon the normative resources that were always already there. Following Schacht’s lucid account, this is, however, to turn Nietzsche’s and Gehlen’s account of the origin of subjective interiority on its head. Subjectivity did not arise when social existence imposed itself upon an instinctually impulsive animal, rather an inner-world began to arise with the partial individuation, that is, ‘second detachment’, of hominins from a normatively dense social world in which they had been instinctually well integrated for over a million years. Perhaps a side-bar, but this inversion would also be consistent with the view that the emotions and instincts of which Nietzsche and Gehlen are wont to speak of would have long since been ‘hominized’, for example, the formation of social emotions such as guilt and shame, prior to individuation. The philosophical anthropology of the Hybrid Hominin thus locates that ‘hiatus’, so central to the thought of Gehlen, as not between impulse and action but between the impulse integrated action of ‘The Group’ and the partially individuated action-standpoint in which normativity begins to speak ‘for-itself’. His nods to the unavoidable sociality of the human notwithstanding, it was Gehlen’s largely normatively-poor naturalism that rendered him more than susceptible to authoritarian ‘solutions’. 
 	Blumenberg’s anthropology, as it is very well represented in this volume by Vida Pavesich, can also be productively analyzed in terms of two detachments. The ancestral Hominin Group can be seen as providing the requisite orientation that first detachment made necessary. Again, it is the onset of second detachment that raises the stakes by unsettling the mute consolations that provided stability over eons. With second detachment, itself likely to be concomitant and co-extensive with the appearance of spoken language, myth and rhetoric became the compensation for the destabilization of the orienting functions of The Group. Through new cracks in the quasi-absolutist totality of the normative in-itself, a ‘nature’ not subject to instinctual response must be re-tamed through rhetorical means. Blumenberg’s hypersensitivity to the pain of the in-itself de facto absolute that we have lost, manifests itself in his eternal vigilance against any new pretender to that throne. 
 	Pavesich’s very sensitive portrayal of the affective infrastructure necessary for effective consolation (and its vulnerability to forces of capitalist modernization) should be supplemented by acknowledging that that consolation which traditionally takes place within the confines of a group identity has also been the source of invidious distinctions and sectarian violence between groups.​[11]​ In this light, the significance of the more universalistic possibilities of a normativity that has, reflectively and critically, become a ‘normativity-for-itself’, perhaps by way of an anthropologically reconstituted orientation toward a new Sittlichkeit, can be properly appreciated.​[12]​ 
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^11	  For a discussion, from a neuro-science of cooperativity point of view, of the relationship between consolation and xenophobia see Moss, 2013. 
^12	  In his recent major work, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life (2014), Axel Honneth has revisited the Hegelian conception of a ‘Sittlichkeit’ in a way that lends itself well to bringing an anthropology of the Hybrid Hominin into a productive encounter with an irreducibly social conception of freedom. 
